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Abstract  
A flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy emphasizes the importance of 
the ordering of policy measures. The flow of policy implementation is to establish an 
industrial zone, to invite an anchor company, and to promote its related companies to 
invest in the industrial zone. This article delineated “a flowchart approach to 
industrial cluster policy” by proposing sufficient conditions for forming industrial 
clusters typical in the manufacturing industry in Asia to enhance regional economic 
growth. The typical industrial cluster policy was theorized by defining an industrial 
zone as ”quasi-public goods”, and it was shown that the policy enhances economic 
growth under a production function of ”increasing returns to scale” of an anchor 
company. Critical amounts of the production of ”scale economies” that are used by 
the related companies to decide whether or not to invest in clusters were also shown. 
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1. Introduction 
A policy for forming an industrial cluster, or an industrial cluster policy, plays an 
important role in developing a region in European Union countries. A cluster is a 
geographic concentration within a nation or region of interconnected companies, 
specialized suppliers, service providers, and associated institutions in a particular field. 
One case is that of Western Scotland. There are a number of examples that show the 
practical application of industrial cluster models and policy measures in East Asia. 
Ministry of Economy , Trade, and Industry (METI) in Japan approved 19 industrial 
cluster plans (see Mitsui, 2003). Malaysia’s Second Industrial Master Plan of 1996-2005 
includes policies to promote development of competitive clusters in the electronics 
industry. The Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand (IEAT) is a state enterprise under 
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Industry. It was established in 1972 to carry out the 
country's industrial development policy. Thailand’s National Economics and Social 
Development Board (NESDB) plans, and Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand (IEAT) 
implements regional development policy by forming industrial clusters. In June 2004, 
the NESDB announced that within three years, it intends to form eight clusters as the 
core of the automobile and electronics industries in four regions. The IEAT plans to 
establish industrial zones specifically for industrial clusters such as that of the 
automobile cluster of the Eastern Sea Board Industrial Zone.  
Porter (1990) recommended what he termed a diamond approach. Four points of the 
diamond represent factor conditions, demand conditions, related industries, and firm 
strategy/rivalry. The four points of the diamond thus represent the four basic attributes 
that affect regional productivity and innovation. Each of the four attributes is 
self-reinforcing. Each also has a unique and important role to play in a region’s business 
environment, and they all operate together as a system. But the diamond approach is not 
really industrial cluster policy, because the four factors do not make the role of 
government clear.  
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Markusen (1996) classified four types of industrial agglomeration, but these types 
do not provide direct explanation for common patterns of Asian experiences in regional 
development. Kuchiki (2003) found that conditions for forming new clusters in northern 
Vietnam included: (a) industrial zones, (b) capacity building of physical infrastructure 
along with institutional reforms in investment procedures, (c) anchor firms in the 
manufacturing industry, and (d) related firms. We showed that industrial zones, together 
with a combination of infrastructure and institutions, played crucial roles in 
development of industrial agglomerations. However, no one thus far has discussed 
theoretical aspects of sufficient conditions necessary for success in industrial cluster 
policy.  
In this article, a “flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy” is developed by 
proposing sufficient conditions for forming industrial clusters typical in the 
manufacturing industry in Asia, and by theoretically explaining the sufficiency of these 
conditions for enhancement of regional economic growth. The typical pattern of 
forming industrial clusters in East Asia is theorized by defining ”quasi-public goods.” It 
is then demonstrated that industrial cluster policy enhances economic growth under a 
production function of ”increasing returns to scale”, and further that critical amounts of 
production of ”scale economies” for firms to decide to invest in clusters can be 
determined. Concepts of “quasi-public goods”, “increasing returns to scale”, and “scale 
economies” are crucial to this theoretical development. Sufficient conditions include 
establishment of industrial zones, building of capacity, and invitation of anchor firms 
together with their related firms. First, industrial zones as quasi-public goods are 
provided by both organizations in the quasi-public sector and by firms in the private 
sector. Second, industrial cluster policy can enhance regional economic growth in cases 
where an anchor firm operates under “increasing returns to scale”. Markets for sales in 
Asia are large enough for anchor firms to attain “increasing returns to scale”. Third, the 
fixed capital of companies related to the anchor company determines the minimum 
optimal size of car production of “scale economies”. A flowchart approach to industrial 
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cluster policy emphasizes the importance of ordering and timing of policy measures. 
The flow of policy implementation establishes an industrial zone, invites an anchor 
company, and promotes that anchor company’s related companies to invest in the 
industrial zone. 
It should be noted that industrial cluster policy is different from industrial policy. 
Industrial policy is a national policy for intervening in markets to foster specified 
industries as picked winners. Industrial cluster policy is a part of regional development 
policy. It is important to make the roles of local governments clear in relation to 
industrial cluster policy and the formation of industrial clusters. Though Kuchiki (2003, 
2004) illustrated successful cases of the flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy 
in industrial clusters of northern Vietnam and Tianjin in China, more examples are 
needed to provide reduction to a prototypical model of the flowchart approach in East 
Asia. The flowchart approach may be applied to other cases in Asia.  
Section 2 defines “quasi-public goods” and applies this definition to industrial zones 
and capacity building. Section 3 demonstrates that industrial cluster policy in East Asia 
can enhance regional economic growth in cases where anchor firms operate under a 
production function of “increasing returns to scale”. Section 4 explains how markets in 
China are large enough for firms related to anchor firms to be able to attain “scale 
economies”. Section 5 includes discussion of conclusions. 
 
2.1 The Role of Quasi-Public Goods of Industrial Zones on Industrial Cluster Policy 
 
This section includes a definition of quasi-public goods and clarifies the role of local 
government in implementing industrial cluster policy. Both private and quasi-public 
sectors can optimally provide quasi-public goods for industrial cluster policy. 
Samuelson (1954) made a bi-polar distinction between pure public and pure private 
goods in the real world, and between these extremes fall quasi-public (non-pure) goods. 
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There are some goods that seem to have characteristics of both pure public and pure 
private goods. Samuelson (1958) conceded that many goods, which are commonly 
defined as public goods, do not fit his definition, and many articles have been published 
which allow further closing of the gap between pure private and pure public goods.  
This section attempts to make clear the confusion that has arisen in discussing 
public goods by revealing the implicit assumptions of Samuelson’s model. For that 
purpose three criteria are defined that characterize goods. A taxonomy of these articles 
may be developed by utilizing these criteria. 
Attention will be placed on the criteria of non-excludability or excludability, 
non-rivalness or rivalness, and non-optionality or optionality. Each characteristic may 
be formulated mathematically, and a model may be built that involves public goods and 
covers quasi-public goods as well. Arguments for optimal conditions of goods in terms 
of the three characteristics may then be made. 
Some propositions and implications will then be advanced. Even if a good has 
rivalness, market failures may still occur if that good is non-excludable and 
non-optional. Vertically added demand curves may also be considered. Even though a 
good is non-excludable and non-rival, all of the individual marginal rate of substitution 
need not be added vertically if that good is optional. There may also be a clue to aid in 
solving the dispute between Samuelson (1964) and Minasian (1964) that has been seen 
on television. An important point is that the property of non-optionality is crucial in 
optimality conditions. 
“Quasi-public optional goods” may be defined as non-excludable or non-rival, and 
optional. From the point of inequality, it may be concluded that quasi-public optional 
goods should be decentralized according to peoples’ preferences. It is often said that a 
mixed economy consists of the public and private sectors. However, it seems that the 
importance of quasi-public sector, which belongs to neither the public nor private sector, 
has recently been magnified. The concept of quasi-public optional goods is useful to 
make clear the role of the quasi-public sector. This section illustrates the most desirable 
quasi-public goods that may be supplied by both the quasi-public and the private sector. 
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Section 2.2 presents four criteria for classifying goods. In section 2.3, a model is 
built that includes some kinds of quasi-public goods. Section 2.4 contains optimality 
conditions. Finally, section 2.5 shows that industrial zones with tax incentives and 
one-stop services have the properties of quasi-public goods. 
 
2.2 Criteria for Classifying Goods 
 
This section includes definitions of non-excludability, non-rivalness, non-optionality, 
and non-indivisibility. 
 
[NE] Non-excludability, [E] Excludability: 
A non-excludable good is one in which the supplier is not free to exclude 
individuals from using it at small or zero costs once the good is produced. Suppose that 
a good (X) is produced in x units, and that the available ratio of an individual (i) is ki ( o 
≦ ki ≦ 1). Then the available level of X to the individual is xki. A non-excludable 
good is one in which ki is determined at the same time that the good X is produced. It is 
given to the supplier, and the supplier cannot change ki. An excludable good is one in 
which ki can be changed by the supplier at nearly zero cost if that supplier wishes to. 
Thus, ki is not constant but variable relative to suppliers. 
 
[NO] Non-optional, [O] Optional: 
A non-optional good is one in which a demander i cannot change consumption level 
(xi) freely once an available consumption level is determined as xki. A constraint of a 
demander i is that the demander must consume all available levels of X in the case of a 
non-optional good. The available level is xki. So xi = xki. In the case of an optional good, 
the maximum available level is also xki, but demanders can change levels of 
consumption. The demander can choose a value of ki from zero to one (0 ≦ ki ≦ 1). 
Dorfman (1969), as quoted by James (1969), indicates that 
There are certain goods that have the peculiarity that they are available to 
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everyone, and no one can be precluded from enjoying them whether he 
contributed to their provision or not.” In other words, ”A non-optional 
good is one for which some positive consumption level is exogenously 
imposed, and any attempt to deviate, either upward or downward, 
requires additional expenditures. 
 
[NR] Non-rivalness and [R] Rivalness:  
A non-rival good is one in ”which all enjoy in common in the sense that each 
individual’s consumption of such a good leads to no reduction from any other 
individual’s consumption of that good” (Samuelson, 1954). In general, non-rivalness 
does not mean that the same precise product quality is available to each demander. For 
example, demander 1 who lives close to the police station is considered to have better 
protection than the demander 2 who lives far away from it. That is, 
                k1＞k2.  
 It may therefore be deduced that in the case of a rival good, the following must 
hold:  
{ }∑ ≤≤≤= 10,1 iiir kkkk 　　　  
In the case of a non-rival good, on the other hand, the possibility is 
      { }∑ ∑ ≤≤≤>= 10or1 iin kkkkk ii １，　　　　　　　 . 
 
［ID］Indivisibility, [D]Divisibility 
Goods are in the form of discrete units, some of them quite large or “lumpy”. 
Usually, an indivisible commodity is defined as an “integer” (see Gomory and Baumo, 
1960; Frank, 1969; and others). 
Figure 1 depicts the process from production to consumption and explains which 
process relates to each characteristic. Non-excludability or excludability relate to the 
process of supply, and non-optionality or optionality to the process of demand. Using 
these characteristics, articles in the theory of quasi-public goods may be reviewed. For 
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example, Holtermann (1972) corresponds to [D] [NE] [R] [O] [ID], and Davis and 
Whinston (1967) to [ID] [NE] [R] [O]. Samuelson’s pure collective goods are [NE], 
[NO], and [NR], ki＝１ for all i. Theoretical studies of indivisible goods appear in print 
with increasing frequency because these are more relevant for solving real world 
problems. It is necessary to analyze cases that remain untouched. Hereafter, attention 
will be given to [NE] or [E], [NR] or [R], and [NO] or [O] (see Appendices 1 and 2). 
 
2.3. The Model 
 
Consider the following cases and examples corresponding to each: 
V: [NE] [NR] [NO] ---national defense, national security (self-sufficiency of food) 
W: [NE] [NR] [O] ---television broadcasting, radio waves 
X: [NE] [R] [O] -------oxygen in a limited space 
Y: [NE] [R] [O] ------outdoor circuses, green utilities (agriculture) 
Ｔ: [NE][NR][O]------research 
Z: [E] [R] [O] ---------bread 
 
Proposition 1: If a good is excludable, each ki is a variable for the demander i. Each 
demander must determine the optimal value of ki; otherwise, ki remains indeterminable. 
Therefore, it cannot be non-optional. 
The economy has six kinds of goods including two kinds of pure public and private 
goods  
 
(V,Z), and four kinds of non-pure goods (W, X, Y, T). Here, (V1,-----Vj;  
W1,---------,Wk ;  
 
X1,----------,Xℓ;  Y1,--------,Ym; Z1,-------,Zn;  T1,---------,Tp)=(V,W,X,Y,Z,T). In the 
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following equations, superscripts refer to persons and subscripts to goods. 
When properties of goods are considered, the constraints of these goods are as 
follows: 
 a
i
a
i
a VV ｖ=                (1) 
where 0≤ iaｖ ≤1, 
i
aｖ  are constants, and ∑
i
i
aｖ >１is possible 
for all i, a=1, ---, j. 
 iWｂ≤
i
ｂｗ Wｂ,             (2) 
where iｂｗ correspond to 
i
aｖ  in (1). 
 ∑
i
iZｅ≤ eZ ,    e=1, ------, n   (3) 
Constraint (2) indicates that no more goods can be consumed than is allowed by the 
quantity of goods available to the individual i. Here iaｖ ,
i
ｂｗ ,
i
cx  and 
i
dｙ  
corresponding to ｉｋ  are used in section 2.2. 
 
Proposition 2: The optimality condition of T, in which non-rivalness plays a crucial 
role, is the same as that of W. In the case of T, however, it is always necessary that iｆt  
corresponding to ｉｋ be equal to unity for all i (see Appendix 3). 
 
Proposition 3: Whether a good is rival or non-rival will not result in essential 
differences in the optimality condition between W and Y. The result is similar to the 
relationship between V and X (see Appendix 3). 
 
It may be assumed that the production possibilities for the economy are described by 
a well-behaved transformation locus  
F (V, W, Z) ≤0. 
Here V represents pure public goods, W represents non-excludable, non-rival and 
optional goods, and Z refers to pure private goods. Hereafter, T is omitted because of 
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Proposition 2. Attention is also placed on V and W because of Proposition 3. 
Each individual’s utility function (ui) and the social welfare function (U) may be 
assumed to be the same as that of Samuelson (1964). The maximization problem is 
written in Appendix 4. 
 
2.4. Optimality Conditions 
 
The results of V and Z are well known. That is, if pure private goods Z are chosen, then 
an individual should consume an amount that equals his weighted marginal utility to the 
price of the good. The multipliers can be interpreted as shadow prices. For each pure 
public good V, the sum of the marginal rate is equal to the inverse of that private good in 
the consumption of the pure one. The distinction between public goods and private 
goods has been held to lie in the non-rivalness of public goods (Musgrave, 1969). 
However, the crucial characteristics are not that of non-rivalness, but rather those of 
non-optionality and non-excludability (Appendix 4). Musgrave (1969) says, 
Due to the nonrivalness of consumption, individual demand curves 
are added vertically rather than horizontally as in the case of private 
goods. 
 
This statement is not always true in terms of definitions given in this article. 
 
Proposition 4: If a good is optional, then even if it is non-excludable and non-rival, 
the optimality condition does not require 
MRT,MRS =∑ i  
where MRS and MRT denote marginal rate of substitution and marginal rate of 
transformation, respectively. 
Consider the extreme 
 MRT,MRS =i  for i∈Mb. 
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It is possible that the “benefit principle” holds in the case of optional goods W. Probably, 
the way of charging tolls succeeds from the viewpoint of optimal allocation of resources, 
for users cannot choose but to reveal their true preferences. A similar argument also 
applies to non-excludable, rival, and optional goods Y. 
 
 Proof: The Kuhn-Tucker conditions with respect to W are: 
 A= ( ∂U / ∂ｕi )(∂ｕi / ∂ ⅰｂW )－
i
bβ ≤0、A・ ⅰｂW ＝0、 ⅰｂW ≥0、 
             i=1, ---------, s,              b=1, -------, T.      (4) 
 B=  ∑
i
i
bβ －α・ ⅰｂW ・∂F/ ∂ ｂw ≤0、B・ ｂW ＝0、 ｂW ≥0 (5) 
 C= －( ⅰｂW －
ⅰ
ｂw ｂW )≥0、C・
i
bβ ＝0、 ibβ ≥0            (6) 
 Consider the following definitions: 
 ｂM = {i│
ⅰ
ｂW /
ⅰ
ｂw ＝max (
1Wｂ/
1wｂ、---、
s
bW /
s
bw )} 
 tM = {1, ------s} 
 bN = tM － ｂM  
The Sets ｂM  cannot be empty, since the constraint (6) must be binding for some 
persons in order to have a rational allocation of resources. Thus, the multipliers ibβ  
(for i ∈ ｂM ) become positive. The strict inequalities,  
 －( ⅰｂW －
ⅰ
ｂw W b)<0,   for  i ∈ ｂN , 
must be held in (6). Therefore, from (6), 
 ,0=ibβ  for i ∈ ｂN . 
Notice that whether the individual belongs to bM or ｂN also depends on
1wｂ. In this 
process, 1wｂplay an important role. Suppose that some set bM  consists of a single 
element. That is, consider the extreme case where the maximum is only one person. The 
strict inequality must hold in (6) except for the person. Then,  
 ∂U / ∂ｕi ・∂ｕi / ∂ ⅰｂW ＝α・
ⅰ
ｂW ・∂U / ∂ ｂW , i ∈ bM . 
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It is possible to suppose that such situations will occur. In general, however, the sets 
bM  will consist of more than one person. Attention may be placed on the sets 
bM alone. Here it is very important that in the process of getting optimality conditions, 
those who belong to the sets ｂN  can be neglected. In general, they do not want to 
consume goods W. 
This proposition has some implications. First, Samuelson (1955) argues: “A point on 
the efficiency frontier requires equality between the vertically-added marginal rates of 
substitution of all men for the public and private goods.” 
However, it is possible that in the case of W([NE][NR][O]) or Ｙ([NE][R][O]) 
different individuals’ MRS need not be added vertically. It is possible to leave those 
who do not belong to the sets bM  out of consideration. 
 
2.5. Industrial Zones as Quasi-Public Goods 
 
Consider  an export-processing zone with one-stop services and tax reductions with 
exemptions to promote exports. The zone, which is constructed as a single unit within a 
300-hectare plot, has a town equipped with infrastructures. A town of the zone 
consisting of factories, housing, and amusement facilities is indivisible, but it is also 
excludable and optional to each company. An office at the zone provides services and 
procedures for companies to establish their plants. One-stop services are rival and 
optional. Taxes such as income and import tariffs of companies are reduced or exempted. 
Tax incentives in an export-processing zone are “non-rival” and non-optional. In the 
next section, G denotes the total government investment in an export-processing zone. 
The Asian experience of economic growth shares common characteristics. The 
economic sector is separated into the private sector and the public sector. Further, goods 
are categorized into those subject to “market competition” and those that generate 
“market failures.” The private sector bears the responsibility for market competition 
(Arrow D in Figure 2), and the public sector bears the responsibility for market failures 
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(Arrow B in Figure 2). Intervention in the private sector by the public sector is the 
active industrial policy of Arrow C in Figure 2. This is a textbook approach in 
economics. 
Figure 2 shows the role of the public sector in market failures, for the most part 
sufficiently analyzed by economics. Experiences in Asia, however, show that 
private-sector corporations cover market failure losses as Arrow A in Figure 2. Arrow A 
is a new activity under globalization. For example, multinational corporations (IPP’s or 
Independent Power Producers) supply electrical power to Asian countries. BOT (Build- 
Operate- Transfer) is a system by which the private sector supplies infrastructures. 
Certain infrastructures are categorized as public goods and thus represent one type of 
market failure. Japanese trading corporations supply infrastructures using this system in 
Asia.  
As shown in Figure 3, the role in economic growth played by the quasi-public sector 
may be clarified. This sector is positioned midway between the private and public 
sectors. Arrow F in Figure 3 shows roles of the quasi-public sector in providing 
quasi-public goods. In the quasi-public sector, the Industrial Estate Authority of 
Thailand played an important role during the construction of industrial zones in 
Thailand in the latter half of the 1980’s. These industrial zones effectively functioned to 
introduce foreign investment to Thailand. The point that requires emphasis here is that 
quasi-public goods supplied by the quasi-public sector played a leading role in the early 
stages of economic development. Note that Arrow A shows roles of the private sector in 
providing quasi-public goods. Multinational corporations establish export-processing 
zones. 
Regarding another common characteristic of the Asian experience of economic 
growth, the quasi-public sector plays an important role in the process of economic 
development, as shown in Figure 3. One typical example of a market failure is a pure 
public good. A pure public good is non-exclusive, non-competitive, and indivisible, as 
explained in Section 2.2. Numerous quasi-public goods, such as export processing 
zones, exist. However, they may not possess all three properties but one or two. Roles of 
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the quasi-public sector must be distinguished from those of the private sector by taking 
into account the property of quasi-public goods when the government takes an industrial 
cluster policy. 
In some cases, it is desirable that quasi-public goods be supplied by economic 
agents in the quasi-public sector. So far, there has been perhaps too much discussion 
about the roles of the state or government without sufficient analysis of the 
“quasi-public goods” that should be supplied by economic agents in the quasi-public 
sector. 
 
 
3.1. A Regional Growth Model: Increasing Returns to Scale in Anchor Firms 
 
Asian experiences in the 1980’s showed that industrial zones or export processing zones 
(EPZ’s) in East Asia contributed to the generation of employment opportunities. EPZ’s 
limit job opportunities to people around the sites of EPZ’s. An interesting question is 
whether or not EPZ’s as quasi-public goods can enhance the aggregate growth of a 
region by forming industrial clusters.   
In a pioneer work, Hamada (1974) analyzed EPZ’s. Grossman and Helpman (1991) 
built a model which takes into considerations both innovators and imitators of new 
technology. The purpose of this section is to determine conditions under which EPZ’s 
can enhance aggregate growth and to examine whether or not reduction in foreign 
investors’ tax rates is effective in enhancing aggregate growth. To that end, this section 
includes the application of a model of Grossman and Helpman to EPZ’s. 
Based on experiences in East Asia, an EPZ model can be built that explains a 
growth mechanism in East Asia in which industrial zones or export processing zones 
link multinational companies pursuing cost reduction with governments of recipient 
countries implementing deregulation and preferential tax treatment. Specific focus is 
placed on the role of the EPZ’s in East Asia. ,A behavioral theory relative to 
multinationals that invest in EPZ’s is also applied.  
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In constructing a macroeconomic growth model to analyze effectiveness of EPZ’s in 
enhancing aggregate growth of a nation, it can be concluded that national income can be 
increased by reducing profit taxes if production functions of final goods of 
multinational companies in EPZ’s have increasing returns to scale. Further, 
governments should invite multinationals to EPZ’s if costs of invitation are much 
cheaper than those of imitation, or if the number of intermediate goods of multinationals 
is larger. 
Section 3.2 contains the development of a growth model of an industrial cluster with 
industrial zones, and also includes examination of a case where multinationals of 
country 1 are innovators, and local firms of country 2 imitate innovations of the 
multinationals by paying the fee for imitation. Section 3.3 includes analysis of a case 
where, in addition to section 2, multinationals of country 1 make a decision about 
whether or not they will invest in EPZ’s of country 2. Conclusions are presented in 
Section 3.4. 
 
 
 
3.2. The Case of a Country Imitating Innovations of Multinational Companies 
 
In this section, a model of an industrial cluster with industrial zones is constructed, and 
it is shown that a region can grow at high rates by adopting a preferential tax policy( )t . 
Two cases are considered: 
Case 1: Multinational companies of country 1 are innovators, and local firms of 
country 2 imitate the innovations of these multinationals at the cost of imitation,ν . 
Case 2: In addition to Case 1, multinational companies of country 1 make a decision 
about whether or not they will invest in EPZ’s of country 2 by themselves. 
In Case 1, it can be assumed that innovative products are intermediate inputs into the 
production of a single final good. Households can consume the final good Y . The 
technology for producing final output requires intermediate goods and input of labor. 
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Intermediate goods are produced by labor alone, and labor also is the sole input into 
research and development. 
Following Romer (1990), the production function of the firms in industrial zones in 
Guangzhou to imitate firms in country 1 may be written as 
 Y A L X j
j
n
2 2 2
1
2
1
1= −
=
∑α α  , 
where 0 1 1< <α , n  is the number of varieties of intermediate goods, A2  is a 
productivity parameter, L2  is labor input, and X j2  is the employment of the j th type 
of intermediate good. The government is assumed to run a balanced budget financed by 
a proportional tax at a rate of t . Here, an innovator in country 1 is an intermediate 
goods producer. An imitator in country 2 is a final goods producer. 
The profit of the producer of final goods in country 2 (π2F) is 
  π 2 2 2 2
1
1
F j j
j
n
Y wL P X= − −
=
∑  , 
where w  is the wage rate, and Pj  is the price of the intermediate good j .  
The condition to maximize the profit is  
   X L A Pj j2 2 2
1 1= −( / ) /( )α α  .      (7)                                         
Next, monopolistic competitions in intermediate goods may be assumed. The profit 
of producers in country 2 of intermediate good is  
   π M j j j j jP X X X2 2 2 2= ⋅ −( ) .   (8)                                         
The solution for the monopoly price is 
  Pj = 1/α  .                 (9)                                          
Hence, if (7) and (9) into (8) are used for substitution into Pj  and X j2 , then  
  { }π α α αα αM j L A2 2 21 1 2 11= − − −( ) / / ( ) / ( )  .    (10)                               
It may be assumed that the business is free to imitate the j th intermediate good. 
Thus, anyone can pay the imitation cost ν  to secure (in the unit of Y ) the net present 
value Vj(T) at time T. This can be obtained by time γ from T to infinity:  
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          Vj(T) ∫∞= T jM 2π  e-r (γ-T)dγ  ,       (11) 
where r  is the interest rate and is constant. The free-entry condition requires that 
  Vj(T)=ν.                      (12)                                       
Equations (11) and (12) give  
  π M j jV r2 / =  , 
that is,  
  { }r L A= − − −( / ) ( ) / / ( ) / ( )2 21 1 2 11ν α α αα α  .    (13)                             
It may be assumed that households maximize utility over an infinite horizon:  
  { }⋅−−= ∫∞ −0 1 )1(/)1( δδcU e-ργdγ 
where ρ  is the constant rate of time preference, δ is the coefficient of risk aversion, γ 
is time, and c  is consumption (Here, the rate of population growth is assumed to be 0).  
The growth rate of consumption is 
  & / ( / ) ( )c c r= ⋅ −1 δ ρ  .                  (14)                
Balanced growth may be assumed, so Equations (13) and (14) yield the growth rate 
of country 2 as follows: 
  { }[ ]./)1()/()/1( ,// )1/(2)1/(1220 ρααανδ αα −−=
==
−−AL
YYccg &&
      (15)                    
 
 
3.3. The Case of Multinational Companies Investing in Export Processing Zones 
 
In Case 2, firms from country 1 decide to invest in an export-processing zone (EPZ) in 
country 2. 
Let G  represent the total of government investment in an export-processing zone 
as explained in Barro and Sarai-i-Martin (1995). The production function of a final good 
Y  of the firms from country 1 in the EPZ is  
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  Y A L X Gj
j
n
1 2 1 1
1
1=
=
∑γ α β( )  
where L1  is labor input, and X j1  is the employment of the j th type of intermediate 
good. The profit for the firms in the EPZ of the final good before taxation is  
 π θ2 1 1 2 1
1
1
F j j
j
n
Y wL P X= − −
=
∑  , 
where w is the wage rate, and θ  is country risk in the EPZ for firms of country 1. 
This was explained in the previous section and is different from the productivity 
parameter A2 .   
Whether multinationals make a decision to invest in the EPZ depends on whether or 
not the country risk θ  is lower than the threshold rate. The value of this threshold is 
determined by the key variable of tax rate t , and this depends on the government of 
country 2. The lower the tax rate made by the government of country 2, the more easily 
the firms of country 1 may invest in the EPZ of country 2. The importance of the role of 
government in providing quasi-public goods is emphasized below.  
Here, the case of foreign investment of firms from country 1 in the EPZ is 
considered. In terms of the currency of country 2 before taxation, the profit of firms 
from country 1 relative to an intermediate good is  
 { }π α α θ αα αM j A L1 2 1 1 2 1 11= − − −( ) / ( ) / ( ) / ( ) . 
Then, the tax revenue for the government of country 2 is  
 t M jπ 1 .                                      (16)                                
The total flow of monopoly profit to country 2 from the imitation of a new product 
of country 1, and the invitation to the EPZ in country 2, is the sum of the flows shown 
in the Equations (10), (15) and (16): 
 { } { } jjj XXtLAR 1212)1/(2)1/(122 /)1(/)1( α
γααααα αα +−+−= −− , 
where the second term is profit tax revenue, and the third term is labor income per 
industry. 
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It is assumed that the government of country 2 has spent cost λ  to invite firms 
from country 1 to the EPZ. So, the total cost of country 2 is  
  ν λ+ .  
The rate of return to country 2 is  
  )(/2 λν +jR .  
Then, the growth rate of country 2 is  
 { }ρλνδ −+= )/()/1( 21 jRg .                    (17)                                 
Setting g1 – go = K – 1, 
where  
{ } 1
)1(
)1()( 1
2
111
)1)(1(
2
)1)(1(
2
−⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−+×−−⋅=
−−−−−−−−−−−− βα
ββα
γ
βα
βαβα
β
αβα
αβ
αα
γγαθαλ
ν tt
L
LnAK , 
it can be seen that the sign of g g1 0−  depends of the sign of K. The larger are νλ , and n, 
the more probable the sign of g g1 0−  will be positive. In other words, governments 
should invite FDI to EPZ’s if the cost of invitation is much cheaper than that of 
imitation, or if the number of intermediate goods is larger. 
It may be supposed that a government runs a balanced budget financed by a 
proportional tax at rate t . That is, 
  t GFπ 2 = , 
The conditions for the maximization of the firm in country 2 in the EPZ’s is 
  wL n A L X Gj1 1 2 1 1/ ( )= γ θ γ α β ,     (18)                              
and 
  P A L X Gj j= αθ γ α β2 1 1 ,      (19)                              
Using equation (9), (18), and (19), the following wage revenue of jth industry is 
obtained: 
  wL n X j1 1
2/ /= γ α .       (20)                             
It can be shown under what conditions a recipient country should set the tax rate to 
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be higher in order to enhance aggregate growth rate by inviting multinational companies 
and reducing the profit tax. The partial derivative of K  with respect to t  is 
  ∂∂
βγ
α α
α
α β
K
t
H t ta= ⋅ ⋅ + −
⎧⎨⎩
⎫⎬⎭ ⋅
−
− −
−1
21
1
1( )
 , 
where { }H L
L
A n= − −− − − − − − − − − −11
2
2
1 1
2
1 1 11
γ
α β αβα β α
β
α β α βα βνλ α θ α γ
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )  . 
The sign of ∂∂
K
t
 is negative in the case of 1 0− − <α β  and α < 1  (the 
production function of this case has increasing returns to scale).   
Suppose that the production function of a final good Y  of the firms from country 1 
in the EPZ has increasing returns to scale, that is, 1< +α β . Then, national income is 
increased by the reduction of the profit tax. The lower the tax rate, the higher the growth 
rate. 
 
3.4. Conclusions 
 
Two conclusions may be advanced: (1) National income is increased by reducing the 
profit tax if the production functions of final goods of multinationals in EPZ’s of a 
developing country have increasing returns to scale. (2) A government of a developing 
country should invite multinationals to its EPZ’s if costs of invitation are much cheaper 
than costs of imitation, or if the number of intermediate goods of multinational 
companies is larger. 
In the Hamada (1974) model, the welfare effects of an EPZ depend on the factor 
intensity of protected sectors in the domestic economy. Results in this article show that 
these effects depend on whether or not the multinational company’s industry has 
increasing returns to scale or not. If the industry is the case, a government has a crucial 
role in inviting multinationals to their EPZ and enhancing aggregate growth by reducing 
tax rates. 
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4. Sufficient Condition for Establishing a New Plant in a Cluster 
 
This section describes a case of increasing returns to scale with fixed capital. Suppose 
that firms use indivisible fixed capital. Fixed costs are costs needed at a level of very 
little production. Average costs decrease when fixed costs are large, and marginal 
variable costs are small. The average cost function may have a U-shaped curve when 
fixed costs exist; that is, average costs initially decrease and then increase. There exists 
an optimal size of production where the marginal costs are equal to the average costs.   
An anchor company of car assembly cars has a group of component companies, 
since a standard car is assembled from more than 25 thousand components. This fact 
may be applied not only to Japanese companies, but also to the Korean company 
Hyundai and to the American company General Motors. Clusters in the automobile 
industry are forming in Guangzhou in southern China, Shanghai in central China, and 
Tianjin and Beijing in northern China. Distances from Shanghai to Tianjin and from 
Shanghai to Guangzhou are respectively 12 hundred and 20 hundred kilometers. Thus, 
component companies must locate near anchor companies when anchor companies 
exceed certain levels of production. For example, related companies of Toyota belong to 
a group called Kyohokai. Together with Toyota Motor Corporation and its member 
companies, the objective of Kyohokai is to produce cars to sell to people near their 
plants. 
In both Shanghai and Guangzhou, Japanese firms were interviewed on the subject of 
their optimal sizes. Three different types of component companies were found: (1) 
Component companies of Type I do not locate near their anchor companies since their 
products produce a variety of products and are not specific to their anchor company. (2) 
Component companies of Type II belong to the group of an anchor company and must 
locate their plant near that anchor company regardless the production size of their own 
anchor companies. (3) Component companies of Type III locate their plants near their 
anchor company only if they can attain their minimal average costs at their minimal 
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optimal size of production. Interview results showed that minimal optimal sizes ranged 
from 100,000 to 700,000. 
In discussing whether or not the related firms of an anchor firm will invest in a 
cluster, economies of scale of the anchor firm must be taken into consideration.  
Hypothesis: The development of an industrial cluster depends on market demand, or the 
quantity of production of an anchor firm. If an anchor firm expands its production size 
because of expected expansion of sales, then its related firms will establish new plants 
in the cluster.  
In the following, independent variables of transportation costs are distance, cross-dock 
logistics, and modularity. 
t = f (distance, cross dock logistics, modularity). 
It is assumed that an increase in transportation costs caused by technological progress of 
modularity depends on management and technology:  
m = g (management, technology).  
It is well known that external economies depend on a number of related firms in a 
cluster. 
In equations below, the following notation is used: 
t: transportation costs per unit, 
m: increase in transportation costs per unit caused by technological progress of 
modularity, 
e: external economies, 
s: movement costs for a related firm to establish a new plant, and 
q: quantities of production. 
It is assumed that the technology of modularity does not change, that movement costs 
are fixed, and that the number of related firms is also fixed. It can then be concluded 
that quantities of production determine whether or not related firms shift their plants to 
a place near their anchor firm locations. A related firm’s decision depends on the 
quantities of production of an anchor firm. That is, a related firm compares its total 
transport costs (tq) with its movement costs (s) as follows: 
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s < tq, or s/t < q. 
The difference between transportation and movement costs reduces the profits of a firm. 
An increase in transportation costs due to new modularity technology is crucial in 
deciding whether or not the related firm will establish a new plant at a cluster as 
follows: 
s < mq, or s/m < q. 
Expected gains from external economies (e) can be deducted from movement costs (s). 
Total costs not to establish a new plant are the transportation costs (tq plus mq). Thus, 
the related firm compares the expected gains with the total costs,  
s - e < tq + mq. 
One of the sufficient conditions for the related firm to establish a new plant in its anchor 
firm’s cluster is: 
(s - e) / (t + m) < q. 
An illustration of how quantities of production are crucial to determining whether or not 
related firms will establish new plants may be seen in the following examples: 
 
(1) Firms in Shanghai 
Type I: Company P: 
Company P, established in 1995 in China, produces four kinds of components including 
speakers for car audio and mobile phones. In 2001, Company P’s research and 
development produced designs of die-casting for its products in Shanghai. Company P 
has the means to prevent its designs of die-casting from being stolen. It procures more 
than 90% of necessary components in China and sells about 8% of its products to 
Toyota in Tianjin, Honda in Guangzhou, and GM in Shanghai, China. Kamigumi, a 
Japanese logistics company, collects Company P’s products for Toyota in what can be 
termed a “milk-run way” such as how Japanese milk companies distribute milk bottles 
to homes in the morning. Company C is not inclined to outsource its components. It 
sells its car audio to car companies and also sells its speakers for mobile phones to 
Motorola in Tianjin. Thus, it has no plan to invest in Guangzhou in near future. 
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Type II: Company D: 
Company D produces computerized electronic components. Being an electronic 
component producer, it has a close relationship with its anchor company. Company D 
shares important confidential data with the anchor company, including customer data. 
Company D joins in the development of the design of new cars with its anchor company 
from the early stages of the research and development. There are few large worldwide 
companies such as Denso of Japan, Bosch of Germany, and Delphi of the US. These 
companies have no other choice but to locate near their anchor companies. 
Type II: Company T: 
Company T is a logistics company of a Japanese automobile anchor company and 
adopts the aforementioned milk-run way and a cross-dock strategy. The milk-run way 
allows component companies to prepare their products to be shipped by a time specified 
by their anchor company. Company T goes round to collect these products. The 
cross-dock strategy is a method to package the collected components by a “just-in-time” 
system in order to provide components efficiently to the anchor assembly company. 
Company T has 5 routes of the milk-run way. One point of collection covers 
components for 200 cars. Efficient logistics weaken incentives of component companies 
in Shanghai to invest in Guangzhou and Tianjin. However, Company T must locate its 
anchor company where its components can be provided just in time. This is much like a 
Keiretsu company, a Japanese term for a set of companies with interlocking business 
relationships and shareholders. It is expected that sales of automobiles in China in 2010 
will reach more than 10 million. 
Type III: Company K: 
Company K produces lamps for automobiles. Its transportation costs from Shanghai to 
Guangzhou are more than 10% of total costs since these products need a lot of space. 
The minimal optimal size of production is 300,000. The company cannot invest in 
Guangzhou if it is profitable for the company to transport products to Guangzhou, and 
Toyota in Guangzhou exceeds its products by 300,000. This is because the company 
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cannot convince its shareholders to establish a plant in Guangzhou if the plant is losing 
money. 
Type III: Company A: 
Company A produces crankshafts for engines and cone rods. As these components are 
used mainly for the central part of engines, material must be easy to process and cut as 
well as be strong. Company A is so capital-intensive that the investment amount reaches 
ten million dollars. The optimal size of production of one line at a plant is 500,000. 
There are only three large Japanese companies in this industry. Company C has no plan 
to invest in Guangzhou since it is located in Shanghai and transports its products all 
over China. 
Type III: Company S: 
Company S is a forging company. Cold rolled steel sheets used in the automobile 
industry are not produced in China, and this type of sheet requires the high technology 
of “deep-drawing”. Anshan Iron & Steel Group Corporation has formed a joint venture 
company with Tessen of Germany, and Benxi Iron & Steel Group has formed a joint 
venture company with Posco (Pohang Iron & Steel) of Korea. Chinese companies will 
be able to adopt new technology through these joint ventures. Although the construction 
cost of the Nippon Steel Corporation plant in Kitakyushu is estimated to reach 
approximately 2 trillion yen, the cost will be minimized to one quarter of that if 
construction takes place in China. This can be interpreted to mean that Nippon Steel 
Company has been forced to invest in China for the growing “demand capacity” of the 
Chinese market. Nippon Steel Company will begin to produce material through a joint 
venture with Shanghai Baosteel. The competition within the Chinese steel industry has 
intensified since 1997 when the Chinese government left its steel industrial policy and 
allowed production to increase until it was out of control.  
 
 
(2) Firms in Guangzhou 
Type I: Company T: 
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Company T started its business in China with the production of air-conditioner parts, an 
area not related to automobile production. In China, local companies have been catching 
up with the technological level of Japanese companies in a relatively short term by 
introducing CAD (Computer-aided Design) / CAM (Computer-Aided Manufacturing) to 
metal-molding production. Company T’s products are required to achieve Japanese 
quality levels and Chinese price levels at the same time. A large number of machines at 
a price level between 50 billion and 20 billion yen are needed for equipment investment. 
In 2003, Company T started to produce auto-parts as well as electronic equipment parts. 
As the company does not specialize only in auto-parts, the plant is not required to be 
located close to the automobile production site.  
Type I: Company HL: 
Company HL produces key sets for four-wheeled and two-wheeled vehicles. 
Magnesium and zinc are key materials for production. Plastic die-casting also plays an 
important role in the process of production. HL intends to sell its auto parts products to 
Nissan and Toyota, even though the firm is dependent upon the Honda group in what 
may be called Keiretsu. The minimum production level required to attain economies of 
scale is not clear since HL produces a variety of auto-parts besides key sets.  
Type II: Company HA: 
Company HA is one of Honda’s in-house departments that trade Honda’s genuine 
auto-parts. Though it is a trading company, HA does not possess fixed assets except 
office installations. For this reason, the company can enter Honda’s Investment markets. 
HA has no economies of scale. 
Type III: Company M:  
Company M produces plastic parts and components such as engine covers for Honda. 
Production processes include die-casting, painting, and assembly. The company must 
increase its production for Honda’s new investment in Wuhan City and start Honda’s 
new plant operation in Guangzhou. Company M purchases plastic materials from two 
companies, including Mitsui Chemical, to keep its prices competitive. The company 
uses large-scale machines, and these enable the firm to attain economies of scale after 
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approximately 400,000 Honda automobiles. 
Type III: Company FT: 
Company FT produces clutches, brakes and frames. Production processes include metal 
stamping, welding, painting, and assembly. Maintenance of mold and a method of 
three-dimensional measuring that guarantee precision, are key factors for production. 
The minimum production level of automobiles required to attain economies of scale is 
100,000. 
 
5. Conclusions and Summary 
This article delineated “a flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy” by proposing 
sufficient conditions for forming industrial clusters typical in the manufacturing 
industry in Asia and providing theoretical support for the sufficiency of these conditions 
to enhance regional economic growth. The typical pattern of forming industrial clusters 
in East Asia was theorized by defining ”quasi-public goods”, and it was shown that 
industrial cluster policy enhances economic growth under a production function 
of ”increasing returns to scale”. Critical amounts of the production of ”scale economies” 
that are used by firms to decide whether or not to invest in clusters were also shown.  
Concepts of quasi-public goods, increasing returns to scale, and economies of scale are 
crucial to theoretical development presented here. Sufficient conditions are to establish 
industrial zones, to build capacity, and to invite anchor firms together with their related 
firms. First, industrial zones, capacity such as in physical infrastructure, institutions, and 
human resources as quasi-public goods are provided by both organizations in the 
quasi-public sector and firms in the private sector. Second, industrial cluster policy to 
provide industrial zones and capacity as quasi-public goods can enhance regional 
economic growth in cases where an anchor firm operates under increasing returns to 
scale. Markets for sales in China are at an early stage of development and large enough 
for anchor companies to attain increasing returns to scale. Third, the minimum optimal 
size of car production of economies of scale depends on the size of fixed capital of the 
related companies of anchor companies.    
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A flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy emphasizes the importance of the 
ordering and timing of policy measures. The flow of policy implementation is to 
establish an industrial zone, to invite an anchor company, and to promote its related 
companies to invest in the industrial zone. Further, the recipient country’s government 
reduces its role in order to promote competition. It thereby transfers greater authority to 
local governments and makes more use of the quasi-public sector (public corporations 
and state enterprises). As a result, the quasi-public sector is likely to supply quasi-public 
goods (see Table 2). The improvement and expansion of network formation in Asia by 
both multinational corporations and the quasi-public sector are thus prerequisites to the 
upgrading of Asia’s industrial structures. 
 
 
 
* The author is greatly indebted to M. Fujita, R. Kada, H. Kim, J. W. Longworth, C. 
Nakajima, Y. Maruyama, K. Suzumura, and M. Tsuji for helpful suggestions and 
constructive comments on an earlier draft. Responsibility for errors, of course, remains 
with the author. 
 
 
 
Appendix 1:  Practical Considerations 
There have been some requests for decentralization. Some economists criticize the high 
degree of centralization in governmental power. Friedman (1962) indicates that national 
public goods often serve the benefit of a particular group or result in an economic waste 
contrary to the intention of the central government.  
Sugioka (1976) advocates “Regionalism”. This means that governmental power should 
be decentralized; this is one of the most important topics in Japan. 
Little concrete consideration has been given to the question of what kinds of goods 
and services should be supplied by: (1) local governmental units or (2) the sector that 
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belongs to neither the public nor private sectors. 
The importance of sector seems to have been increasing recently. In order to make 
the part of the sector clear, the concept of quasi-public optional goods is useful. W, Y 
and T are defined as quasi-public optional goods in terms of the above analysis. Here, 
the concept of quasi-public goods is used. 
The sets ｂM , which represent peoples’ needs or the structures of their optionality, are 
used below. 
(1) Quasi-public goods that are demanded by most local citizens in a city. Sets ｂM , 
consist of such citizen demands (e.g. parks in the cities). From the viewpoint of equity, 
local government units should supply such goods. 
(2 Organizations in the sector that belongs to neither the public nor private sector 
supply quasi-public goods. These cases have recently become important but do not 
seem to be analyzed sufficiently. Suppose that farmers in a country need many kinds of 
quasi-public goods. Quasi-public optional goods cannot be neglected. It is not 
appropriate for the local governmental unit to supply them because of inequality. In 
general, private firms will not give priority to quasi-public goods in terms of 
profitability. For example, agricultural cooperatives may be considered as economic 
units that supply quasi-public goods. Examples are as follows: 
T: Establishment and management of water facilities  
T: Wire broadcasting 
T: Research on special products (e.g. flowers) 
T: Information about markets 
Y: Roads for agricultural use 
The sector may supply some kinds of quasi-public optional goods as “local private 
collective (production or consumption) goods”. Of course, further analysis on the sector 
will be needed to make the roles of cooperatives clear. 
 
Appendix 2 
Individual Concern versus Collective Concern: 
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Millerton (1972) defined this characteristic, and this is similar to Buchanan’s (1965) 
statement: “The interesting cases are those goods and services, the consumption of 
which involves some “publicness”, where the optimal sharing group is more than one 
person or family but smaller than an infinitely large number. The range of “publicness” 
is finite.” 
 
Appendix 3 
Proof:  Non-rivalness requires 
      0≤ iｆｔ ≤1, 
then 
      iｆｔ ｆT ≤ ｆT . 
Define  
     iTｆ＝
i
ｆｔ ｆT  
The constraints of T will be  
    iTｆ≤ ｆT , 
and these are the same as those of W. 
 
Appendix 4 
Proof: When the constraints with respect to W and Y are interpreted, only the 
differences between iｂｗ  and 
i
ｄｙ  which are constant may be considered. If the 
possibilities are 
 ∑
i
i
ｂｗ >1, 
then the constraints correspond to W.  If the following must hold 
 ∑
i
i
ｂｗ ≤1, 
then they correspond to Y. Both are the same in the process of calculating optimality 
conditions. The way of interpretation may only be changed according to iｂｗ . Similarly, 
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the relationship between X and V can be discussed. Attention is thus concentrated on V 
and W. 
 
Appendix 5 
Max   U [u1(V;W1;Z1), ---, us(V;Ws;Zs)]                           (1) 
 Subject to  
 F (V,W,Z)≤0                                                  (2) 
 iｂW ≤
i
ｂｗ bW ,ｂ＝1,---,ｋ, 
              i ＝1,----,s,                                      (3) 
 ∑
i
iZ e ≤Ze, e=1, ---,n,                                            (4) 
 V, iW ,W, Zi, Z ≥0                                              (5) 
Let α, ⅰｂβ , γe represent the multipliers associated with constraints (2), (3) and (4), 
respectively. 
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Figure 3.  Importance of Quasi-Public Goods
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Figure 4. An Industrial Cluster Formed by an Anchor Firm
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Table 1.  Export Processing Zones as Quasi-Public Goods
NR or R NE or E NO or O
I. Industrial Zone (200 ha) R NE O
II. Infrastructure 
(1) Electricity R E O
(2) Roads NR NE O
(3) Water Supply R E O
III. Institutions
(1) Tax Preferences NR E O
(2) One-Stop Services NR E O
Rivalness Excludable Optional
Note: NR, R, IND, D, NE, E, NO, and O denote non-rival, rival, 
        non-excludable, excludable, non-optional, and optional, respectively.
Source: The Author
Relationship
with the Anchor
Company
Name of the
Company Product Characteristics
Type Ⅰ Company P Audio for Cars andMobile Phones
Cover more than 90% of audio components
in China.
Company　D
Computerized
Electronic
Components
Necessary that as a group company, it be
located close to the anchor company with
which it shares important data.
Company　T Logistic Company Offers both the milk-run way and cross-dockstrategy.
Company　K Car Lamps
Cluster process accelerates when the anchor
company's sales of cars reach more than
300,000.
Company　A
Crank Shafts for
Engines and Cone
Rods
Cluster process accelerates when the anchor
company's sales of cars reach more than
500,000.
Company　S Cold Rolled SteelSheets
Independent from the anchor company at a
production size of  more than 700,000.
Type Ⅱ
Type　Ⅲ
Table 2. Industrial Cluster in Shanghai
Relationship
with the Anchor
Company
Name of the
Company Product Characteristics
Type Ⅰ Company　T Air-Conditioners forAutos and Other
Does not specialize only in auto parts, and
the plant is not required to be located close
to the automobile production site.
Company　HL Key Sets for Cars Depends on Honda Group
Company　HA
Traiding Company
for Honda Genuine
Auto Parts
There are no economies of scale, and it is
one of Honda's in-house departments.
Company　M Plastic Parts (e.g.Engine Covers)
Attains economies of scale after production
of 400,000 cars.
Company　FT Clutches, Brakes, andFrames
Attains economies of scale after production
of 10,000 cars
Type Ⅱ
Type　Ⅲ
Table 3. Industrial Cluster in Guangzhou
